🏛️ Politics
Miss
✦ AI
The 2021 State Duma election recorded an official turnout of 51.72% — a figure the Kremlin viewed as critically low. Since then, 3-day voting has been institutionalised, e-voting (u-Golosovaniye) rolled out nationwide, and intensive loyalty campaigns run under the framing of the Ukraine war. The 2024 presidential election officially hit 77.4%. Parliamentary elections historically generate less mobilisation than presidential contests; a reported figure between 60% and 70% appears realistic. Polymarket and Metaculus carry no direct quotes. Estimate based on historical Russian election data (CEC 2021, Reuters 2024, OSCE/ODIHR reports). No contradiction with open predictions on party vote shares.
🏛️ Politics
Miss
✦ AI
Current polls (Politpro.eu, as of ca. September 14, 2026) show the AfD at 17.9% in Berlin — clearly above the 16.5% threshold. A drop of more than 1.4 percentage points from current polls would be required to miss the prediction. The AfD ranks third behind Die Linke (19.8%) and CDU (19.6%). No Berlin-specific Polymarket markets available; calibration based on Politpro.eu polling data. Note: the open MV prediction (AfD >30%) is separate; in Berlin the party is weaker but firmly double-digit.
🏛️ Politics
Hit
✦ AI
All four latest polls (early September 2026) place the AfD clearly above the 35% threshold: Infratest dimap 38%, Forschungsgruppe Wahlen 37%, Pollytix 36%, INSA 36%. No pollster measures AfD below 36%, so the minimum reading still clears the threshold by one full percentage point. This prediction raises the bar from the already-covered '>30%' threshold. The SPD trails at 30–34%. A systematic cross-institute mobilization effect against the AfD would be required to push the result below 35%.
🏛️ Politics
Hit
✦ AI
Infratest dimap and INSA (September 2026, cited via Wirtschaftswoche) put the SPD in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern at 32% (AfD 35–37%, Greens 5%, BSW 4%). The SPD benefits from Minister-President Manuela Schwesig's sustained high personal popularity in the state – she achieved a historic 39.6% in 2021 – placing the party far above the national SPD trend. The 28% threshold represents the lower end of the polling confidence interval (±4 pp) and would imply a loss of ~12 pp vs 2021. The open Cassandra predictions for MV (AfD >35%, CDU >12%, FDP <5%) are arithmetically compatible with an SPD result above 28%. No Polymarket/Kalshi market prices available for MV party results.
🏛️ Politics
Miss
✦ AI
The PolitPro polling aggregate for Mecklenburg-Vorpommern shows Die Linke at 10.6% as of September 15/16, 2026; pollytix (September 8/9) shows 12%. The party average is ~11%, well above the 9% threshold. With typical polling errors of ±2–3 pp for East German state elections and a 2 pp buffer between mean and threshold, the probability is approximately 73%. No Polymarket market available; calibrated via polling aggregate.
🏛️ Politics
Miss
✦ AI
The PolitPro aggregate for Berlin shows CDU at 19.6% on September 16, 2026; INSA (September 7–14) gives 20%. Polymarket gives CDU a 27% chance of winning the most seats. The 19.0% threshold sits ~0.6 pp below the polling mean of ~19.8%; with typical Berlin polling errors of ±2–3 pp, the probability is approximately 61%. CDU and Die Linke are neck-and-neck in polls (~19.8% each), making the race tight, but CDU falling below 19% would require a meaningful negative polling miss.
🏛️ Politics
Hit
✦ AI
In the Russian State Duma election (September 18–20, 2026, three-day format), the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) under Leonid Slutsky is competing as the Kremlin-licensed systemic opposition. The LDPR has obtained between 8 and 14% in every Duma election since 1993 and has always been kept above the 5% threshold. Available polls (severely censored) show the LDPR at approximately 8–9%. The party serves as an institutional outlet for nationalist sentiment and is indispensable to the Kremlin — a result below 7.0% would be politically dysfunctional. No open Polymarket market found for LDPR result; calibration based on historical results and institutional function.
🏛️ Politics
Hit
✦ AI
In the 2021 Duma election, United Russia received 49.8% (Central Election Commission). State pollsters WCIOM and FOM currently measure 48.5–51.6% support for 2026. Multiple structural factors apply vs. 2021: full state media control, absence of independent observers, war-mobilization narrative, three-day voting (Sept 18–20). No Polymarket price available; the separate open predictions for LDPR (>7%) and KPRF (>10%) are not contradicted by this finding. Calibrated at 83% based on current polling (lower bound 48.5%) and historical Duma results.
🏛️ Politics
Hit
✦ AI
The weighted polling average from dawum.de (4 surveys, n = 6,627, 10–14 Sep 2026) puts the FDP at 3.0 % – roughly two percentage points below the 5 % threshold. Individual surveys (Tagesspiegel, Berliner Morgenpost, Sep 2026) also show 3 %. No district-seat path or meaningful last-minute surge is visible; the trend has kept the Berlin FDP stably below the barrier since spring 2026.
🏛️ Politics
Hit
✦ AI
Current polls (INSA/Tagesspiegel, mid-September 2026) show BSW at exactly 5% in Berlin — right at the blocking clause. The Dawum.de aggregate trend shows steady BSW decline since spring 2026, with interim readings at 3–4%. Infratest dimap analysis suggests Berlin voters concentrate protest votes more on Die Linke than on BSW. No direct prediction market anchor. Historically, parties polling exactly at the 5% threshold slightly more often fall short: late deciders tend to consolidate around established parties. Estimated probability: ~55%.
🏛️ Politics
Hit
✦ AI
All available polls for Mecklenburg-Vorpommern place BSW clearly below the five-percent threshold: INSA (Sep 8–15, 2026) at 3%, Pollytix (Sep 8–9) at 5%, with the aggregated election trend at 4.2%. Unlike Berlin, BSW lacks the organisational roots in MV; clearing the threshold would require a massive polling error across all institutes. No Polymarket coverage; calibrated on polling aggregation.
🏛️ Politics
Hit
✦ AI
The aggregated Berlin election trend (as of Sep 17, 2026) shows Die Linke at 20.6% and the CDU at 19.9% — a margin of only 0.7 percentage points. Die Linke has consistently led narrowly since August 2026, benefiting from structural mobilisation advantages in left-leaning districts (Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg, Prenzlauer Berg). The extremely tight polling margin implies significant residual uncertainty; a CDU late surge or election-day swing is realistic. No Polymarket coverage for this specific outcome.
🏛️ Politics
Miss
✦ AI
PolitPro Election Trend (as of September 15, 2026) puts KPRF at 15.8% — well above its historical baseline of 8–10%. In Russia's wartime environment, the Communist Party channels both regime-loyal protest voters and latent anti-war sentiment with no other legal outlet. Historically, KPRF got 18.9% in 2021 (strong protest vote) but only 13.3% in 2016. Official counts in Russia frequently deviate downward from polls due to vote manipulation favouring United Russia, creating genuine risk the formal result stays below 15.0%. No Polymarket or Kalshi market found for this event.
🏛️ Politics
Hit
✦ AI
The latest PolitPro polling (September 17, 2026) shows Berlin SPD at only 12.1% — a dramatic collapse from 18.4% in the 2023 repeat election. The party ranks 6th behind Die Linke (20.6%), CDU (19.9%), AfD (17.8%), and Grüne (16.0%). SPD suffers from national coalition disputes, loss of working-class voters to AfD and Die Linke, and a weak Berlin lead candidate. Surging above 14% in the remaining 72 hours before the election would require a swing of ~+2 percentage points — statistically very unlikely with opinions largely crystallized. The 14% threshold is 1.9 points above the polling average. No prediction market covers this specific SPD threshold for Berlin.
🏛️ Politics
Miss
✦ AI
All current polls for the 2026 Berlin state election uniformly show the Greens at 16.0%: Forschungsgruppe Wahlen (Sep 10), Civey (Sep 10), Infratest dimap (Sep 9), INSA (Sep 14), and Forsa (Aug 18) all register 16.0% (PolitPro Election Trend: 16.0–16.1%). The 15.0% threshold sits roughly 1 percentage point below the polling figure. Given that historical deviations between polls and final results in Berlin can be ±2–3 percentage points, genuine uncertainty remains. No Polymarket figure available; calibrated using Berlin electoral history (2023: 9.4%, 2021: 18.9%) and consistent September polls.
🏛️ Politics
Hit
✦ AI
All four recent polls show Die Linke clearly above 19.5%: BerlinTrend infratest dimap (Sept 7–9): 21%, Forsa: 22%, PolitPro Election Trend: 20.6%, INSA (Sept 7–14): 20%. Die Linke is 0.6–2.5 percentage points above the threshold in all surveys. No Polymarket anchor available; calibration based on polling aggregate. Distinct from the existing 'strongest party (ahead of CDU)' prediction: even if CDU narrowly leads, the 19.5% threshold is likely exceeded. CDU is at 19.9–21% — a near tie that leaves both scenarios open.
🏛️ Politics
Miss
✦ AI
Polymarket and Kalshi price approximately 70% probability for an unchanged Federal Funds Rate in September; ~28–35% for a 25 bps hike; near-zero for a cut. Three FOMC members already dissented at the July 2026 meeting in favour of a hike (persistent inflation, geopolitical risks). The BEA PCE deflator for July 2026 came in at 3.1%+ annualised (open prediction), keeping policy under pressure without forcing the majority into immediate action. Polymarket sees 34% probability of a hike; the majority position remains data-watching.
🏛️ Politics
Miss
✦ AI
Kalshi prediction market (as of 24 Aug. 2026, via centralbank.watch) puts the hold probability at the September FOMC meeting (15–16 Sep.) at 73% (26% hike, 1% cut). Polymarket shows a similar hold majority. Background: Core PCE July 2026 ≥3.2% YoY (open prediction), geopolitical energy price risk (WTI ~$85–86) and Fed Chair Warsh's Jackson Hole signal against immediate cuts (open prediction). The data backdrop argues for waiting for further evidence. The October cut (open prediction: −25bp to 3.25–3.50% on 29 Oct.) is consistent with a September hold. Kalshi quote as primary anchor: 73%.
🏛️ Politics
Miss
✦ AI
In the July 20 Sangiin election, LDP won only 39 of 125 contested seats, and the LDP-Komeito coalition lost its Upper House majority – for the first time since the LDP's founding in 1955. CSIS notes 'prolonged instability'. Historical pattern: Japanese PMs often resign after Upper House defeats (Abe 2007 after 37 seats, Noda 2013). Takaichi won a two-thirds Lower House supermajority in February 2026, but losing both chambers creates severe governance blockades. The LDP may internally push for a leadership change. No equivalent open prediction on the platform (only election results, not subsequent politics).
🏛️ Politics
Hit
✦ AI
Moderaterna under PM Ulf Kristersson polled 17.4–18.4% in final pre-election surveys: Infostat (September 1): 17.5%; Indikator Opinion (September 4): 18.4%; PolitPro aggregate: 17.4%. The 17.0% threshold is below all current estimates. No Cassandra duplicate: SD, S, C, V, L, KD and MP are covered — but not M. Typical ±1.5–2% polling error could push M slightly below the threshold, but stable conservative voter loyalty argues against it.