US Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS): Nonfarm Payrolls for July 2026 (released August 7, 2026) come in below 100,000 new jobs created (confirmed by BLS press release)
Hit
✦ AI-generated prediction
Published on 28. July 2026
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Predicted for 7. August 2026
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Based on: Statistical Pattern
July 2026 employment data will be published on the first Friday of August (August 7, 2026). June 2026 data (released July 2) came in at just 57,000 new jobs — far below the consensus of ~110,000 (SignalPro/CNBC), continuing the downtrend; unemployment rose to 4.2%. Capital Economics expects a July rebound to ~130,000. This prediction is a counter-thesis: ongoing tariff uncertainty, lagged monetary-policy employment effects, and structural weakness in manufacturing could prevent July from reaching 100,000. Probability of 40% reflects honest uncertainty — slightly below 50%, as rebound effects are possible, but the trend remains bearish. No prediction-market price available.
Data basis for this prediction
- CNBC: 'U.S. job creation cools in June with payrolls growth of just 57,000; unemployment rate at 4.2%' (02.07.2026)
- SignalPro Markets: 'USD Non Farm Payrolls July 2026: 57 (missed forecast)' (02.07.2026)
- Capital Economics: US Employment Report Preview – July 2026 forecast ~130,000 (Stand 28.07.2026)
- BLS.gov: Employment Situation Summary – June 2026 Results (02.07.2026)
Note: This is an AI-generated statistical forecast for entertainment and information purposes. It does not constitute investment advice or a recommendation to buy or sell any financial instrument.
Verdict: Hit
Die BLS-Pressemitteilung vom 7. August 2026 wies für Juli 2026 einen Netto-Verlust von 23.000 Nonfarm-Payrolls aus – weit unter der 100.000-Marke und sogar negativ. Konsensprognosen lagen bei ca. 83.000–95.000 Stellen (CNBC, Quartz). Damit traf die Vorhersage voll zu: Statt eines Rebounds (wie von Capital Economics mit +130.000 erwartet) verschlechterte sich die Lage deutlich. Zusätzlich wurden die Vormonatswerte massiv nach unten revidiert (Mai: –66.000, Juni: –37.000). Haupttreiber der Juli-Schwäche: Stellenabbau im lokalen Bildungsbereich (–50.000) und im Einzelhandel (–19.000). Quellen: BLS Employment Situation July 2026 (https://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.nr0.htm), CNBC (https://www.cnbc.com/2026/08/07/jobs-report-july-2026.html), Quartz (https://qz.com/us-payrolls-july-2026-jobs-report-080726).
📈 Economy
✦ AI
Monetary policy trajectory: September hike to 3.75–4.00% at 78–81% probability (Polymarket/defirate.com aggregated); October hold per existing Cassandra prediction. For a December hike: US headline CPI August 2026 well above 3.0% YoY (BLS, Sept 11), hawkish Fed Chair Kevin Warsh (Jackson Hole August 2026: 'readiness for further tightening'), 10-year yield near 5% as a market signal of persistent inflation. The existing Cassandra prediction ('Fed funds rate at least 4.00–4.25% by Dec 31, 2026, at least two further 25bp hikes') explicitly implies this December step as hike #2 after September. Counterpoint: the November FOMC (Nov 4) could alternatively be the timing, with December then holding.
📈 Economy
✦ AI
The US 10-year Treasury yield stood at 4.95–4.96% on September 11, 2026 — at the cusp of the psychologically pivotal 5% level. Polymarket/defirate.com aggregate a 78–81% probability of a 25bp FOMC hike on September 16 (CME FedWatch: 60–64%). A hike would almost certainly push the yield above 5.00% the following trading day; even a hold in hawkish language — Fed Chair Warsh's posture since his August 2026 Jackson Hole speech — sustains upward pressure. The existing Cassandra prediction of 'above 4.80% on Sept 17' is a lower threshold and is not duplicated here.
📈 Economy
✦ AI
The US Census Bureau releases the Advance Retail Sales report for August 2026 on September 16, 2026 (8:30 AM EDT), same day as the FOMC decision. August 2026 CPI accelerated above 3.4% YoY (BLS, confirmed September 11). Back-to-school effects structurally support August. July retail sales showed +0.5% MoM. No direct prediction market; bank consensus ~+0.3–0.4% MoM. The +0.4% threshold is slightly ambitious but plausible given sustained nominal inflation pressure.